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In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Manufacturers in Product Liability
Actions
Nationwide distribution of merchandise has created a likelihood that persons injured by defective products will reside in a
state far distant from the manufacturer's principal place of business.
In order to provide a more convenient forum for their citizens, many
state legislatures have enacted "long-arm" statutes enabling suit to
be brought in the state where the plaintiff resides. 1 Two basic problems are encountered in attempting to gain jurisdiction over the nonresident manufacturer. The first results from constitutional limitations upon the assertion of judicial power over nonresidents. The
Supreme Court has articulated this issue in terms of fairness to the
defendant in requiring him to defend in a foreign state, with fairness
conclusively established when the cause of action is related to a purposeful contact of the defendant with the state in which jurisdiction
is sought.2 The second problem is simply a matter of statutory
construction. Does the language of the "long-arm" provision encompass what the plaintiff alleges the nonresident manufacturer has
done? For example, when dealing with a statute that confers jurisdiction over defendants who commit a "tortious act" within the
state,3 there is some question whether the tortious act in a product
liability case is committed outside the state, at the time of manufacture, or within the state, at the time of injury.
A wide divergence of opinion exists regarding the wisdom as well
as the constitutionality of extensive jurisdiction through the use of
liberally drafted and construed "long-arm" statutes.4 Hesitance may
I. The following are among those states having "long-arm" statutes: Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Connec:ticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon•
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
2. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 810
(1945). For an analysis of the evolution of the limitations on in personam juris•
diction over nonresidents, see Kurland, .The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 569
(1958).
3. E.g., ILL. RE.v. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959); N.Y. CIV. PRAC, LAW § 802; WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (1959).
4. See generally Cardozo, The Reach of the Legislature and the Grasp of
Jurisdiction, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 210 (1957); Currie, The Growth of the Long ArmEight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Kurland,
supra note 2; Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of
Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. RE.v. 249 (1959); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction Over NonResidents in Our Federal Jurisdiction, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1957); Stimson, Omnibus
Statutes Designed To Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48 A.B.A.J.
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result from a fear of burdening a defendant with the inconvenience
and expense of a foreign suit brought against him solely for the
purpose of harassment. While this comment does not advocate the
extent to which a court should assert the jurisdictional powers conferred on it by a given "long-arm" provision, it examines the scope
of jurisdiction constitutionally permissible over nonresident manufacturers in product liability cases with a view toward formulating
administrable standards that a court may utilize to reconcile the
varieties of commercial activity with the now-frequently-frustrated
legislative goal of providing injured plaintiffs with a convenient
forum.

I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST OF FAIRNESS

A. Supreme Court Pronouncements
In International Shoe Co. v. W ashington,15 the state of Washington sued a nonresident defendant for unpaid contributions to the
state unemployment compensation fund. The alleged basis of liability was the in-state activities of defendant's salesmen. Upholding
jurisdiction in Washington, the Supreme Court stated that a nonresident is amenable to jurisdiction wherever he has established
certain "minimum contacts" within a foreign state.6 The test did
not call for a quantitative analysis of defendant's in-state activities
to see if some numerical threshold had been exceeded. Rather, the
nature and quality of the activities were to be balanced against the
burden of requiring the nonresident to defend in a distant forum. 7
If the judicial scales indicated that the former preponderated, maintenance of the suit would not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."8
However, the flexible factor of judicial sensitivity for the defendant was all but eliminated, and the test acquired a more objective
nature, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.9 The Court there sustained jurisdiction in a suit against a nonresident insurance company
to collect life insurance proceeds where the company's only contact
with the forum was the mailing of the policy to an in-state resident
725 (1962); Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. R.Ev. 909

(1960),
5. 826 U.S. 310 (1945) (hereinafter cited as International Shoe).
6. Id. at 317.
7. "Those demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts of the
corporation with ,the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of
our federal system of government, ,to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there. An 'estimate of inconveniences' which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of
business is relevant in this connection." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
8. Id. at 316.
9. 855 U.S. 220 (1957) (hereinafter cited as McGee).
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and the acceptance of premiums by return mail. The decision did
not necessarily depart from precedent because a single in-state act
in an activity regulated by the forum had long been recognized as
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.10 However, while the Court referred
to the "manifest interest" of the state in providing a forum, it was a
restricted version of the minimum contacts thesis of International
Shoe, rather than the rationale of cases dealing with regulated
activities, that controlled the decision.11 Thus, a fair interpretation
of McGee is that jurisdiction over a nonresident is permissible
whenever he voluntarily performs a single act within the forum,
provided, of course, that the asserted cause of action is related to
the single act upon which jurisdiction is predicated.
The Supreme Court, however, has issued a caveat to those who
would utilize McGee to authorize nationwide service of process by
state courts. In Hanson v. Denckla,12 the residuary legatees of a will
instituted proceedings in a Florida court to invalidate an inter
vivos trust created by a Pennsylvania resident with a Delaware trust
company, the settlor having subsequently moved to Florida. Under
Florida law, the nonresident trustee was an indispensable party
to the suit, his absence being a jurisdictional defect. Correspondence
between the settlor and the trustee was the trustee's only connection with the forum. The Supreme Court ruled that a third party
could not unilaterally impose the contacts requisite for jurisdiction
upon a nonresident who did not himself "purposefully" institute
a relationship with the foreign state.13
10. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (nonresident motorist subject to
jurisdiction under nonresident motorist statute for injuries caused within the
forum state). Under the McCarran Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-15 (1958), the federal government recognizes the wide powers of a state
over insurance activities within its borders. The forum state of California in McGee
had exercised these regulatory powers. CAL. INs. CoDE §§ 1610-20.
11. McGee cited with apparent approval two state court decisions which upheld
jurisdiction over nonresidents who committed single tortious acts within the forum
while conducting unregulated actitivity there: S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277
P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954) (breach of warranty action with contact made by independent
sales representative); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d
664 (1951) (corporate agent committed tort in forum). See McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 n.2 (1957).
12. 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Hanson).
13. Id. at 253. The court explained that the defendant must act in a manner to
invoke the "benefits and protection" of the laws of the forum state.
This statement, being a conclusion of law, has offered little aid in solving the
problems that surround the test for "minimum contacts." After considering the
impact of Hanson on jurisdictional inquiry, the court in DeVeny v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963), concluded that the constitutional test had been un4}anged: "Thus, the long arm of state courts is permitted to reach out-of-state
defendants only in suits growing out of acts which have created contacts with the
forum state, however limited or transient such contracts may be." Id. at 127. (Emphasis
added.) It has been similarly held that a nonresident manufacturer, who supplies
a component part ,to another nonresident manufacturer, invokes the "benefits and
protection" of the laws of the forum state to which the latter manufacturer ships
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B. Jurisdictional Principles in Product Liability Actions

In all product liability cases, one contact with the forum always
exists-the product itself. Thus, the question is presented whether
this single factor is a sufficient foundation upon which to assert
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident manufacturer in a suit
arising from this contact. If the presence of the product resulted
from direct shipment by the manufacturer, the existence of a jurisdictionally sufficient relationship is evident.14 However, the fortuities of product migration do not always permit an automatic association of product location with a deliberate act of the manufacturer
within the forum state. The movement of the product may have
been effected by the consumer or by independent middlemen. Or,
it may have resulted from the distribution of a secondary manufacturer who purchased the defendant's product as a component
for his goods, the component proving to be the defective item.
Since the manufacturer over whom personal jurisdiction is sought
may have had no control over the process by which his product
reached the forum, the attribution to the nonresident of a purposefully instituted relationship becomes less meaningful. The language
of McGee and Hanson, which speak of contacts emanating directly
from the defendant, seems inapposite where such intimacy is lacking. Therefore, fairness to the nonresident, within the meaning
of International Shoe, must be formulated with reference to broader
considerations when the presence of the product stems from a more
circuitous route than direct shipment.
It would seem consonant with fairness to subject the manufacturer to jurisdiction whenever his product gave rise to the cause of
action within the forum state, even though the manufacturer had
no other contact in the state. As far as the manufacturer's economic
objectives are concerned, his overriding purpose is to have his
product consumed. Where this consumption occurs is relatively
insignificant to him. This observation supports the position that
the manufacturer can be summoned to defend a cause of action
arising out of the use of his product wherever it may bt;. located. 15
the completely assembled product. Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 1'76 N.E.2d '761 (1961).
14. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
15. See Feathers v. McLucas, 152 N.Y.L.J. col. 1, p. I (App. Div., 3d Dept., Aug. 4,
1964) CTurisdiction sustained over a nonresident manufacturer of fuel tanks for use
on truck beds. The tank had been supplied to an out-of-state fuel truck manufacturer who sold the truck to another out-of-state fuel distributor. Plaintiff
sustained injuries when the tank exploded in New York, a state with which the
manufacturer had no other contacts.) But cf. Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26
F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960) Gurisdiction in North Carolina unconstitutional where
motorist's injury in North Carolina was caused by negligent repairs performed in
South Carolina by defendant garage).
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Any inconvenience that may be asserted is more than balanced by
his interest in defending the integrity of his product, the maintenance of which may ultimately determine his economic success.
There can be no unfairness in forbidding the manufacturer to
disassociate himself from his product. In sum, the manufacturer
should be amenable to personal jurisdiction wherever the product
causes injury,16 wherever he may consensually submit to jursdiction,17 and wherever he may have purposefully established direct
connections with the forum. 18
C. An Analysis of State Court Decisions
A number of courts have sustained jurisdiction where a corporate agent's in-state activities were related to the cause of action. 19
Although it is difficult to project what these courts would have held
had the agent not visited the forum, an increasing number of states
are exercising jurisdiction although the defendant's only activity was
16. Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 15.
17. Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
18. Chovan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours 8: Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich.
1963) (direct shipment of $130,000 worth of dynamite safety fuses into forum over a
two-year period sufficient for jurisdiction when fuse exploded, injuring plaintiff
within forum); Sheridan v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 25 Conn. Supp. 17, 195 A.2d 766
(1963) (direct shipment of negligently packed chemicals); Singer v. Walker, 21 App.
Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964) (direct shipment of geologist's hammer to the forum
state sufficient for jurisdiction over action for an out-of-state injury); cf. Shealy v.
Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962) (employee's deliveries to forum
sufficient); Aldridge v. Marco Chem. Co., 234 Ark. 1080, 356 S.W.2d 615 (1962)
(employee's delivery to forum sufficient); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 12!1
Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963) (dictum). Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957). See Currie, supra note 4; Reese 8: Galston, supra note 4.
19. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); DeVeny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (salesmen in addition to a substantial
volume of sales); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910
(4th Cir. 1962) (independent agent in addition to a continuous traffic of goods);
Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., supra note 18 (employees' deliveries); Berk v. Gordon
Johnson Co., 212 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (salesmen and direct shipment of
product with employees installing defective equipment in forum state); Ewing v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962) (presence of corporate
agent); Connecticut Tool 8: Mfg. Co. v. Bowsteel Distrib., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 290,
190 A.2d 236 (1963) (salesmen in addition to substantial sales volume); Shepard v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959) (salesmen in addition to large
sales volume); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. App. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (employee committed tort in forum); S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655
(Okla. 1954) (presence of independent sales representative); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) (employee committed tort in forum
state); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d !105 (196!1) (in addition to other
factors, defendant's president visited the purchaser of the product); Huck v. Chicago
St. P., M. 8: O. Ry., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958) (sales office in forum state).
Cf. Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F.Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 196!1) (salesmen's activities unrelated to the cause of action); Mays v. Oxford Paper Co., 195
F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (salesmen's activities unrelated to the cause of action);
Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964) (salesmen's activities
unrelated to cause of action, but in-state retailer solicited by catalog). But see
Mueller v. Steelcase Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959) (salesmen in forum state).
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shipping the product to the forum where the plaintiff was injured.20
The rationale previously suggested for jurisdiction in product liability actions agrees with these latter cases as to the low threshold
of required contact, but departs from those cases requiring that
the defendant should have been able to foresee contact with the
particular forum state.21
In Gray v. American Radiator &- Standard Sanitary Corp.,22 jurisdiction was sustained in a suit to recover damages for injuries
received in Illinois when a defective valve caused a hot water
heater to explode. The defendant had manufactured the defective
valve in Pennsylvania and supplied it to an Ohio corporation, which
incorporated the valve into the water heater and shipped it for sale
into Illinois. Jurisdiction was sustained because the product had
created a jurisdictional contact out of which the cause of action
arose. While the court felt that the defendant should have been
able to foresee the product's eventual distribution in Illinois,28 this
factor should not be considered important because the shipment
by the assembling manufacturer was only a continuation of the
flow of the defendant's economic endeavors. An intermediate manufacturer is integral to and only a furtherance of the original manufacturer's enterprise and marketing activities; therefore, the original
manufacturer should be deemed to have a contact with the forum
state sufficient to sustain jurisdiction over it.
It is more difficult to sustain jurisdiction in a state where the
injury, but not the product's distribution, has occurred. However,
20. Hutchinson v. Boyd 8c Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960);
Sheridan v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 25 Conn. Supp. 17, 195 A.2d 766 (1963); Gray v.
American Radiator 8c Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
Ehlers v. United States Heating 8c Cooling Mfg. Co., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824
(1963); Atkins v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Williams v. Connolly,
227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964) (dictum); Chovan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours
Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (direct shipment of $130,000 worth of
dynamite safety fuses into forum over a two-year period sufficient for jurisdiction
when a fuse injured plaintiff within forum); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123
Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963) (dictum).
21. E.g., O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., supra note 20. Jurisdiction was refused
over a nonresident food processor in a suit for injuries caused by the sale of its
product in the forum where the only allegation of contact was that the defendant
placed its product "into the stream of commerce" in Newark, New York. The
court refused to infer foreseeability of use in the forum state as was done in Gray
v. American Radiator 8c Standard Sanitary Corp., .supra note 20. This reluctance may
have been due to the pronounced difference in size of the two companies or to a
difference in state policies with respect to jurisdiction over nonresidents. In any event,
the proposed test rejects the foreseeability distinction as far as due process limitations are concerned. The plaintiff need only allege either distribution or injury in
the forum. Undoubtedly, the language in Hanson troubled the court since a
"purposeful" connection between the forum and the defendant is difficult to find in
the context of such indirect distribution.
22. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
25. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 764,
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the manufacturer's economic purposes are still being effectuated
wherever his products are being consumed. The manufacturer
has taken the initiative in marketing his product for public consumption and jurisdiction should be sustained wherever this enterprise causes injury. It is not unfair to subject a manufacturer to
suit where his product causes injury when it is being used for the
purpose for which it was designed.24
In accord with this theory is Feathers v. McLucas, 25 in which a
New York appellate court overruled a lower court's refusal of
jurisdiction. The defendant was a nonresident manufacturer of fuel
tanks for installation on truck beds, and his only contact with the
forum was the existence of the product which caused the injury.
He had supplied the defective tank to another out-of-state manufacturer who assembled the truck and sold it to a Pennsylvania fuel
distributor operating in interstate commerce. The plaintiff sustained
injuries when the tank exploded on a New York highway. The
court held that the defendant was amenable to suit in New York
even though his marketing activities had terminated in another
state.
The state where the injury has occurred is not, however, the
only state which may exercise jurisdiction over a product liability
action.. In Singer v. Walker, 26 the plaintiff was injured in Connecti24. In the application of this theory it is not necessary to determine whether
the product is particularly dangerous as was done in Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal
Prods. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961) (electric "deep fry" insufficiently
dangerous to warrant jurisdiction). This issue goes to the question of whether
the plaintiff may have a cause of action in implied warranty, not whether the
court may entertain the litigation.
The argument that a foreign suit is a burden on interstate commerce, a doctrine
whose current vitality is questionable, seems to have been limited to cases where
the defendant is a foreign common carrier operating in interstate commerce. Compare
Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923) (jurisdictional statute
violated commerce clause of the Constitution), with Baltimore &: O.R.R. v. Kepner,
314 U.S. 44 (1941) (limiting Davis to its facts) and Standard Oil Co. v. Superior
Ct., 44 Del 538, 62 A.2d 454 (1948), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 336 U.S. 930 (1949). See generally McGowan, Litigation as a Burden
on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL L. REv. 875 (1939); Comment, Jurisdiction Over
Non-Resident Carriers as Limited by Doctrine of Unreasonable Burden on Interstate Commerce, 34 MICH. L. REv. 979 (1936).
25. 152 N.Y.L.J. col. I, p. 1 (App. Div., 3d Dep't, Aug. 4, 1964), But see Arundel
Crane Service v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d 428 (1957); Moss v.
City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).
26. 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Singer); cf.
Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962) (foreign airplane
crash; the basis for jurisdiction was a contract to be partly performed within the
forum with an additional contact by a corporate agent). Compare McAvoy v. Texas
E. Transmission Corp., 185 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Ark. 1960), where the court declined
jurisdiction but indicated it would have reached a different result if the defendant
had sufficient contacts with the forum, regardless of the situs of injury.
If the cause of action arises in a foreign state that is unrelated to the defendant's
activities within the forum, it is generally accepted that jurisdiction may be exercised within the forum only if the defendant has engaged in relatively continuous
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cut by a geologist's hammer which had been purchased by his
aunt in New York. 27 The defendant had manufactured the hammer
in Illinois and shipped it directly to a New York retailer. Since the
plaintiff was a New York resident, he sought jurisdiction there.
The court sustained jurisdiction on the theory that the sale in New
York created a relationship between the parties without which the
injury would not have occurred. The Singer holding was, of course,
correct even under the more traditional theories requiring a purposeful and foreseeable contact with the forum. The hammer had
been shipped directly to New York and the incidence of out-of-state
injury did not affect the defendant's expectations of contact. The
same result should be reached even if the product were shipped
to New York by intermediaries with no subjective expectations of
contact there on the part of the defendant. The sale of products
to a consumer is a contact that is purposefully sought by manufacturers; if the cause of action arises from such activity, the manufacturer should be subject to suit wherever this endeavor is consummated.
II. THE "LONG-ARM" STATUTES
Statutory authority must exist before a state can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The "long-arm" statutes,
through which jurisdiction is accomplished, follow no definite
pattern except for some usual interstate borrowing. A number of
states have statutes that specifically extend jurisdiction to nonresidents whose out-of-state acts create consequences within the
forum. 28 These statutes are especially suited to product liability
and important activities there. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437 (1952) (main office of a Philippine corporation in Ohio during World War II).
Compare Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 235 F. Supp. 257 (W.D. Mich. 1964) (presence of salesmen in addition to a systematic business in the forum state held to
be sufficient activity for jurisdiction over a cause of action accruing outside that
state and unrelated to defendant's in-state activity), with Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l
Airline, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2240 (N.Y. App. Div., Nov. 22, 1964) (in-state ticket reservation office which did not accept, but forwarded, reservations was insufficient
activity to sustain jurisdiction over suit for damages arising from a European
airplane crash).
27. It is generally unnecessary that the plaintiff also be the purchaser of the
product because of the trend to abolish the requirement of privity in product
liability actions. See Jaeger, Product Liability-The Constructive Warranty, 39
NoTRE DAME LAW. 501, 504-05 (1964).
Singer also indicates that where direct shipment is involved, it is irrelevant
for jurisdictional purposes where title may have passed. 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250
N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964).
28. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 34-411(c) (1959); FLA. STAT. §§ 47.16 (Supp. 1964);
MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.715 (1962): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(3) (1960); WIS.
STAT. § 262.05(4) (1963). The benefits of some statutes, however, are limited to
resident plaintiffs. See MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964). The constitutionality of such "door-closing" may be questioned. Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951) (semble); Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
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cases where the injury occurs within the forum state. The remaining statutes vary from those using the old "doing business" terminology29 to those predicating jurisdiction on the commission of an
"act" within the state,80 some statutes qualifying the nature of this
act by requiring it to be "tortious" 31 or "part" of a tort.82
These statutes should be liberally construed to achieve their
intended objective. Assuming the various state legislatures intended
to confer the maximum jurisdictional powers on their courts that
will comport with due process limitations, a suggested approach to
interpretation of the statutes is to direct attention to the three
causal elements which are essential to the manufacturer's liability:
the defective manufacture, the distribution of the product to the
purchaser, and the resulting injury. For example, viewed in this
manner, it seems apparent that the shipment of a product to the
forum is an act committed by the defendant. If there is an intermediate distributor who is also a nonresident, his activity is but
a continuation of the defendant's act of shipment. Using similar
reasoning, the negligent manufacture and the resultant injury are
also acts which, if occurring in the forum state, would sustain jurisdiction. All three elements, i.e., manufacture, distribution, and injury, are parts of the tort, for they represent phases of the continuum
of events leading to the cause of action. While a court's interpretation of a statute should reflect legislative policy toward subjecting
a nonresident to suit, unnecessarily restrictive results have occurred
all too often that could have been avoided by this approach.

A.

The Battle of Semantics

The following examples should reflect the semantic difficulties
the courts have had as they have tried to cope with the language
of various long-arm statutes. These difficulties have led to confusion
in this area of the law and frequent frustration of legislative intent.
The California Code of Civil Procedure prescribes jurisdiction
over any nonresident corporation that is "doing business in this
29. E.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE § 411(2): ILL. REv. STAT. ch. Il0, § 17(l)(a) (1959);
REv. STAT. § 271.610(2) (1962); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 660-7ll (1962): N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3-6(b) (1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 471 (1961); WIS. STAT, § 262.05
(l)(d) (1963). See also MAss. LA.ws ANN. ch. 181, § 3A (Supp. 1964) (cause of action
"arising out of business in this state''); N.H. REv. STAT, ANN. ch. 300, § II (1955)
("transacting business" in state).
30. See PA. Bus. CoRP. LAw § IOIIB (1951), which also requires that the defendant
have done business in the state.
31. E.g., ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. Il0, § 17 (1959); N.Y. CIV. PR.Ac. LAW § 302; WASH.
REv. CODE§ 4.28.185 (1959). See also CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-4Il(c) (1959) ("tortious
conduct" in forum state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(4) (1955) ("tortious conduct" in
forum state).
32. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 803.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964); TEX. CIV. STAT, art. 203l(b),
j 4 (1959); VT, STAT• .ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1959); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 3083 (1961).
KY.
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state."88 The "doing business" theory formerly required that the
corporation transact a substantial amount of business within the
state-enough so that it could possibly be sued on a cause of action
entirely divorced from its activities there. 34 But with a progressive
attitude, the California courts have held that the statute grants
them authority to exercise jurisdiction whenever such action is
consistent with contemporary notions of due process.35 They have
thereby been able to assume jurisdiction when the plaintiff sustained injury within the state and the defendant's activity, other
than the presence of his product, amounted to no more than advertising in a medical journal36 or solicitation through an "independent" sales representative.37
The Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute similarly requires that the
defendant be "doing business" in the state. It, however, affords additional protection to the defendant by providing:
"Any foreign corporation which shall have done business in
this Commonwealth . . . shall be conclusively presumed to
have designated the Secretary of the Commonwealth as its true
and lawful attorney authorized to accept, on its behalf, service
of process in any action arising out of acts or omissions of such
corporation within this Commonwealth." 38
A federal court first interpreted this section in the context of a
product liability action in Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corp.89
The court assumed jurisdiction, concluding that the resultant injury within the forum was an "act" flowing from the defendarit's
negligent manufacture in a foreign state. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court later disapproved this construction in Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co.,40 saying that the only act in a product liability action is
!!!!. CAL. Civ. PROC. ConE § 411(2). "Doing business" or "transacting business"
statutes are particularly useful in gaining jurisdiction over a cause of action arising

in a foreign state tbat is unrelated to tbe defendant's activities within tbe forum.
See Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 235 F. Supp. 257 (W.D. Mich. 1964). See also Wxs.
STAT. § 262.05(l)(d) (Supp. 1965).
!14. See Kurland, supra note 2.
!15. E.g., Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502
(1961). See Note, 10 HAsnNcs L.J. 206 (1958). Similar treatment has been accorded
tbe New Hampshire "doing business" statute. See W. H. Elliot &: Sons Co. v.
Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957).
!16. Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal, App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21
(1958). See also Florence Nightingale School of Nursing, Inc. v. Superior Court, 168
Cal. App. 2d 74, !!35 P .2d 240 (1959) (mail solicitation and correspondence courses).
!17. Cosper v. Smith &: Wesson Arms Co., 5!l Cal. 2d 77, !!46 P.2d 409 (1959),
cert. denied, !!62 U.S. 927 (1960).
!l8. PA. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1011B (1951). (Emphasis added.)
!l9. 248 F.2d !!67 (!ld Cir. 1957). Accord, Mays v. Oxford Paper Co., 195 F. Supp.
414 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
40. 405 Pa. 12, 17!! A.2d 123 (1961). It should be pointed out tbat tbe court
expressly recognized tbat tbe legislature had not chosen to exercise "tbe full
extent of jurisdiction" tbat it might constitutionally have done. Id. at 21.

1038

Michigan Law Review

[Vol 6!1:1028

that of negligent manufacture, which admittedly had not occurred
"within this Commonwealth." Since the product had been shipped
to the forum by the initial consumer as a second-hand article and
the defendant's distributive activity had terminated six years before
in another state, the court was correct in holding that the defendant
had committed no act in Pennsylvania. But by disapproving Florio
and indicating that even the direct shipment of a product to the
forum is not an "act," Pennsylvania, under its present statute, has discarded any possibility of providing a forum for its citizens who are
injured by a product manufactured in a foreign state.
The Illinois statute omits the requirement of "doing business."
It, however, compounds the interpretative problems associated with
the words "act within this state" by requiring that the cause of
action arise from "the commission of a tortious act within this
state."41 In Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,42 the plaintiff sued
for injuries received from a power lawn mower negligently manufactured in a foreign state. The federal district court held that in
product liability cases the only tortious act is the negligent manufacture. Therefore, the mere fact of injury within the forum would
not permit jurisdiction under the statute. However, the Illinois
Supreme Court subsequently disapproved Hellreigel, citing the
Restatement of the Law of Confiict of Laws48 for the proposition
that the place of wrong is where the last event necessary for liability
occurs.'4 Under this analysis, the injury rather than the negligence
completes the cause of action in tort and it alone satisfies the
statutory necessity of a "tortious act." 45
The West Virginia Code is similar to the Illinois "tortious act"
statute in that it provides for jurisdiction as follows:
"A foreign corporation not authorized to do business in this
state . . . shall nonetheless be deemed to be doing business
herein if such corporation makes a contract to be performed,
in whole or in part, by any party thereto, in this State, or if it
commits a tort in whole or in part in this State." 46
It would initially seem that jurisdictional issues could be solved
41. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. no, § 17 (1959) (Emphasis added.) See also N.Y. CIV. PR.Ac.
LAW § 302; WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1959).
42. 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Cf. Dimeo v. Minster Mach. Co., 225 F. Supp.
569 (D. Conn. 1963) ("tortious conduct" committed only at place of negligent
manufacture).
43. REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934). See also GoODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAws § 92 (3d ed. 1949).
44. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
45. Cf. Feathers v. McLucas, 152 N.Y.L.J. col. I, p. 1 (N.Y. App. Div., Aug.
4, 1964); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
46. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3083 (1961). (Emphasis added.) See also MINN. STAT.
§ 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964); TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 203l(b), § 4 (1959); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 855 (1958).
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more readily under this provision than under the Illinois statute
because there is no express requirement of an "act," and the specified
event need be only "part" of a tort, thereby omitting the troublesome requirement that it be expressly "tortious." This provision of
the West Virginia Code has been interpreted, however, to be applicable only when the corporation or its agent is present in the state
at the time of the commission of an alleged tort.47 A West Virginia
plaintiff, therefore, may never obtain jurisdiction in a product
liability case where the negligence occurred outside the forum unless
the product is personally delivered to the state by an agent of the
corporation who remains there until the injury occurs or unless the
corporation makes a contract to be performed, in part at least, in
the state.
In Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 48 a Minnesota federal court reached
the same result as West Virginia with an identical statute.49 The
court, however, interpreted the statute with an eye more colored
by constitutional considerations than by statutory language because
it said: "If jurisdiction were sustained . . . the door would be open
to practically unlimited jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
the concept of the required contacts and connections . . . would
be whittled away." 50 The Mueller interpretation was disapproved
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Atkins v. ] ones &- Laughlin Steel
Corp. 51 The Atkins court approached the problem by considering
the various parts of a tort and concluded that because injury is an
indispensable element to recovery in tort, it is a "part" of a tort.
Since the injury had occurred within the forum, the court sustained
jurisdiction.
This wide divergence in statutory construction has made it extremely difficult for a state legislature to enact a "long-arm"
statute which it can be reasonably certain will be construed in accordance with a legislative intent to confer maximum jurisdictional
capabilities. An examination of the recently enacted Michigan
statute discloses the decisions with which the legislature had to
contend, and the qualifying language necessary to prevent a misconstruction:
"The existence of any of the following relationships between a
corporation or its agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient
basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state
to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such corporation
and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F.Supp. 571 (D. W.Va. 1962).
172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959) (hereinafter cited as Mueller).
MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964).
Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416, 419·20 (D. Minn. 1959).
258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
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such corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any
of the following relationships: . . .
(2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences
to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort." 52
A reasonable interpretation of this statute would appear to allow
a Michigan court to entertain every conceivable product liability
action having some relationship to the forum. Matters of constitutional authority would, therefore, be the limiting factor to exercising jurisdiction. However, it would still be possible, even with this
statute, for a court to refuse jurisdiction for lack of statutory authority where the plaintiff sustains injuries outside the state. No
"consequences" would have occurred within the forum and, under
the Pennsylvania interpretation, no "act" would have occurred
within the state, even if the product had been shipped directly to
the forum.

B. The Evils of Improper Characterization in Statutory
Construction
It is elementary that the meaning of a word will vary with the
context in which it is used. 58 It is apparent, therefore, that the
purpose for which a given classification is made influences the content to be given the language used to express that purpose. Nevertheless, many courts have a tendency to assume that a word used
in a number of different contexts will have the same meaning in
all of them. 54 This has been particularly true in the application of
"long-arm" statutes to product liability cases because the contacts
with which the court must deal do not normally fit into traditional
jurisdictional categories such as actual presence of the defendant
within the state. The only contact may be the inanimate product
itself, brought into the state not by the nonresident manufacturer
but by independent transportation agencies. As a result of this
novelty, the question of whether the contact amounts to a jurisdictionally-sufficient event has often been decided not in terms of the
statutory objectives but by the significance that the event has in
other legal concepts. Frequently, the reference has been made to
52. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 600.715 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
53. "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Mr. Justice Holmes, in Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
54. This is strikingly illustrated in Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv., 232 N.Y.
115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921), where the court had to determine whether a hydroaeroplane while floating on navigable waters was a "vessel." Professor Walter W. Cook
has aptly criticized the tendency to solidify -the meaning of words as having "all
the tenacity of original sin [which] must constantly be guarded against," Coox.,
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942),
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choice of law problems because of the significance a particular event
has in choosing the applicable law.55
Under traditional choice of law theory the law governing a tort
with multi-state implications was that of the state where the injury occurred.56 The injury is viewed as significant because it constitutes the
last act necessary to establish liability.57 Thus, if the injury occurred
within the forum, the court could utilize the choice of law criteria
in the jurisdictional inquiry. While a correct decision might be
reached-under the tests posited herein-it could foster the notion
that the choice of law event was the only significant event for jurisdictional purposes. Carried to its logical extreme, the proposition
would be that a state had power to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents only when it had power to apply its own laws, a manifestly
fallacious conclusion. 58
The statutory language that has particularly troubled the courts
and led to the analogy with choice of law rules is "tort in whole or
in part" and "tortious act." The legislatures undoubtedly used these
words to describe the general sweep of conduct they wanted to
have adjudicated in the forum, separate provisions usually existing
for actions in contract.59 But the legislatures had the further ob55. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961). Gray also referred to the operation of the Illinois
statute of limitations as indicating that the aefendant had caused some legally signifiicant event to occur within the forum at the time of injury because it was sufficient to
start the statute of limitations running. Ibid. In some states, reliance on these statutes to
resolve jurisdictional issues could lead to curious results. In product liability cases, the
plaintiff's action will often lie in both negligence and breach of warranty. The relevant
statutes of limitations for these actions may, however, be triggered by different events:
the sale activating the statute for warranty, and the injury activating the statute for
negligence. If a court were to look to these statutes for an answer to the question
whether the defendant has conducted sufficient activity in the forum upon which to
base jurisdiction, a specious result would be reached if the sale of the product had
occurred within the state, but the injury had occurred elsewhere. The defendant
would have acted sufficiently to be subject to an action for warranty but not for
an action based upon negligence. Although this hypothetical has not as yet been the
subject of litigation, the possible disparity indicates the futility in referring to
other bodies of law to resolve unrelated issues. For a discussion of statutes of
limitations vis-a-vis actions in negligence and warranty, see Freedman, Statutes of
Limitations in Products Liability Actions, 497 !Ns. L.J. 328 (1964).
56. RJ!sTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 378 (1934). The Restaters have since become
dissatisfied with this rule and now propose the "interest analysis" approach, which
applies the law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the
parties and the events leading to liability. RJ!sTATEMENT (SECOND}, CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
57. RJ!sTATEMENT, CONFLIGr OF LAws § 377 (1934).
58. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), with Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958). Additionally, choice-of-law rules can consider the relationships
with the forum of the plaintiff and third parties such as medical creditors, Griffith
v. United Airlines, Inc., 33 U.S.L WEEK 2218 (Pa. Oct. 14, 1964), while the jurisdic•
tional inquiry ought to focus exclusively on the defendant.
59. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964); W.VA. CODE ANN. §
3083 (1961).
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jective of acquiring jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who
had committed single acts within the state, as opposed to the traditional, and now discarded, requirement that the defendant must
have been "doing business" within the state. Since International
Shoe specified that isolated acts which are unrelated to the cause
of actioh could not serve as a basis for jurisdiction,60 the legislatures
were compelled to ensure that the activity to which the courts
directed their attention to establish jurisdiction would be associated
with the cause of action for which relief was sought. In prescribing
jurisdiction over actions in tort, they therefore described the significant isolated acts as those which were "tortious" or "part" of a
tort.
The error committed by some courts was in attempting to give
substantive content to this language instead of treating it as intended-a description of a contact upon which jurisdiction was to be
predicated. The error could have been avoided by looking at the
primary source of jurisdictional law, the International Shoe opinion,
which did not command that the contact itself be capable of sustaining liability. It had only to be related to the events leading to
liability. But imbued with the desire to attribute substantive
significance to the contact under the law of torts, many courts set
out to discover if any wrongful activity had occurred within the
forum. As a result, some said that the negligent act of incorporating the defect into the product was the only wrongful element
of a tort, refusing to exercise jurisdiction if that event had not
occurred within the forum. 61 Others realized that this was the
precise situation in which the legislature had wanted the courts
to exercise jurisdiction. They supported their decision by looking
to choice of law rules that focussed exclusively on the incidence of
injury and found that the injury, not the negligence, was the only
wrongful element of a tort.62 Finally, some courts recognized the
error of drawing an analogy with choice of law rules. But in rejecting this analogy they committed the additional error of discarding the incidence of injury as a jurisdictionally-sufficient event
under the statute.63 While they eliminated the choice of law approach, they retained the idea that the statute requires the
contact to have significance under the law of torts. The weakness
of this approach was recently illustrated by a court faced with an
attempt to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident where neither
60. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
61. See, e.g., Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Hellriegel
v. Sears Roebuck &: Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Cf. Dimeo v. Minster
Mach. Co., 225 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1963).
62. See Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
63. See Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp. 571 (D. W.Va. 1962).
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the negligence nor the injury had occurred within the forum.M
The offending object had been distributed within the forum, however, and the court recognized that this was a jurisdictionallysufficient event. But the court still felt compelled to attribute some
wrongful quality to this act and therefore concluded that the
circulation of the product, a defective geologist's hammer, was analogous to the creation of an enjoinable nuisance within the forum. 65
The fallacy of this approach rests in its circuity. In order to assert
jurisdiction, the court felt compelled to find something representing
wrongful conduct committed in the forum, while the whole purpose
of asserting jurisdiction was to determine whether any tortious
conduct had in fact taken place. Moreover, that the legislatures did
not intend to restrict the application of the statute only to substantively determinative incidents committed by the defendant is buttressed by the language itself, which speaks of parts of a tort or tortious acts. In the light of these considerations, it is suggested that any
facet of the events leading to the defendant's liability-be it the negligent manufacture, the distribution of the product, or the resulting
injury-is a proper basis upon which to assert jurisdiction under
these single-act statutes.

III.

CONCLUSION

The shadowy boundaries of due process limitations on the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents and the interpretative difficulties the courts have encountered with respect to the language of the
"long-arm" provisions have often caused courts to dismiss actions that
constitutionally could have been entertained. Occasionally these
decisions are explainable by the legislature's reluctance for policy
reasons to confer maximum jurisdictional reach on their courts.66
For example, a state with a great number of manufacturing concerns
may limit the reach of its own statute in the hope that other states
will reciprocate, thereby protecting local industries to some extent
from defending suits in distant states. Section l.03(a)(4) of the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act61 reflects such
policy considerations by prohibiting jurisdiction in cases where acts
or omissions outside the state cause injury within the state unless
the nonresident "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state."
If a state should desire, however, to exercise the full scope of
constitutional possibilities in bringing nonresident manufacturers
64.
65.
66.
67.

Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964).
250 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
See Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405 Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961).
9B U.L.A. p. 78 (Supp. 1964).
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before their courts in product liability cases, it is suggested that the
legislature delete the above-quoted language from section l.03(a)(4)
of the uniform act and, in addition, amend section l.03(a) after subdivision (6) by adding a new paragraph to read as follows: "For
purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to have been transacting business in this state whenever his product is distributed in
this state."
Should a state legislature fear that such expanded jurisdictional
powers would offer opportunities for unwarranted harassment of
nonresident defendants, it could further amend the statute to require,
on motion by the defendant, that the plaintiff post bond to cover
the defendant's expenses of suit in the event the court later discovers
that the complaint was frivolous. 68
Harry B. Cummins
68. The Wisconsin legislature has provided that on motion by the defendant,
the plaintiff shall post bond to reimburse the defendant for his litigation expenses
if the action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The amount recoverable is
limited to $500. WIS. STAT. § 262.20(1) (1963). The Michigan legislature has provided a similar procedure by which the defendant may be reimbursed for his
litigation expenses, excluding attorney's fees. However, the statute goes even further
than the Wisconsin provision by permitting recovery whenever the plaintiff loses on
the merits. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.741 (1962).

